NO2ID

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/wikilea ... IPDIS.html

DHS SECRETARY CHERTOFF'S MEETING WITH HOME SECRETARY JACQUI SMITH SIPDIS
Passed to the Telegraph by WikiLeaks 9:04PM GMT 04 Feb 2011

Ref ID: 07LONDON4327

Date: 11/21/2007 16:01

Origin: Embassy London

Classification: SECRET//NOFORN

Destination:

Header: VZCZCXYZ0001RR RUEHWEBDE RUEHLO #4327/01 3251601ZNY SSSSS ZZHR 211601Z NOV 07FM AMEMBASSY LONDONTO RHEFHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DCRUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6389INFO RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0723RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0568

Tags: PINS,PTER,PK,UK

S E C R E T LONDON 004327 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2027 TAGS: PINS, PTER, PK, UK SUBJECT: DHS SECRETARY CHERTOFF'S MEETING WITH HOME SECRETARY JACQUI SMITH SIPDIS Classified By: DCM Richard LeBaron, reasons 1.4 (b,d) Summary -------

1.(C/NF) Home Secretary Jacqui Smith told Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff about her concern about turbulence SIPDIS in Pakistan and explained the future use of biometrics at UK borders at their meeting November 14 in London. The two also conferred about ways to counter radicalization, including by using particular terminology. Secretary Chertoff proposed the two work together especially on the issues of deportation and identification at the upcoming meeting of EU G-6 Interior Ministers near Potsdam. Ambassador Tuttle attended the meeting as did several DHS and Home Office staff.

Border Security ---------------

2.(C/NF) Smith emphasized the seriousness of the "protect" strand in the UK's four strand strategy ("pursue, protect, prevent, prepare"), including border protection and the protection of public places. She said she wanted to understand better the workings of U.S. borders during her December 9-12 visit to Washington. Secretary Chertoff noted the intersection of immigration, economic, and security issues regarding borders and welcomed Smith's visit. He offered to organize briefings for her on U.S. border policies and practices. Smith noted the UK's "EBorder" initiative and offered to provide Secretary Chertoff with detailed information. The goal is to track the movements of 99 percent of those entering and exiting the UK by 2010, she said. Secretary Chertoff stressed the utility of biometrics; he observed that fingerprints from a U.S. visa applicant had been a "hit" on a latent fingerprint found in an early counterterror investigation (although the hit was ultimately resolved with an innocent explanati on). Smith noted that the UK requires visas from the citizens of 111 countries.

Pakistan --------

3.(S/NF) Secretary Chertoff asked Smith to comment on the situation in Pakistan, including the record of terrorist operatives' travel to Europe. Smith responded she has two concerns: First, the UK does not want to jeopardize important UK-Pakistani cooperation in several fronts, including commercial business and family travel but also including joint sensitive operations with Pakistani authorities. Second, Pakistan is a place on the "journey to radicalization" that some individuals take, she reported. So the UK needs to work with Pakistan to determine who travels there. She asked Home Office DG for Security and Counter-Terrorism Charles Farr to elaborate, and he mentioned (1) the worrying access to training camps, (2) travel from the UK to Pakistani madrassas, (3) the recent unreliable cooperation with the Pakistani military while they are "distracted" with domestic issues, and (4) the recent release, by the chief justice, of several terrorist prisoners, including one connected to a UK terror plot. Smith noted it is hard for Pakistani officials to "focus on cooperation when the political direction is unsure." Farr continued "the entry-exit system you gave them works, we know who enters and exits" Pakistan.

Radicalization --------------

4.(C/NF) Smith mentioned her concern about the large number of UK nationals from whom terrorists can recruit. The UK's goal is to limit growth of and control the number of the radicalized, she said, adding other goals are to "confound their ideology, defend the resilience of communities, target individuals, and prevent the inflow of the radicalized." It is also important, she said, to use care in describing government work to counter radicalization. Secretary Chertoff agreed and listed outreach he and DHS had done. Secretary Chertoff asked Smith how the UK described the SIPDIS radicalized in public messages. Smith replied she uses "criminals" and "murderers" and has "moved on" from previous language. But if the Islamic context is removed, something is missing, she added. She said the question is how to enlist the Muslim community against its fringes. It is difficult, she said.

5.(S/NF) Farr explained the word "terrorism" is ambiguous for the Muslim audience but the words "criminality," "abuse," and "safety" are powerful. "Takfiri" is useful for a small audience, he commented. It was noted that Muslim ideological spokesmen - including, recently, a Saudi religious leader - are turning against the extremists, a fact that is proving to be a problem for al-Qaida as recent communication proved. Farr agreed al-Qaida had been upset by the turn of events.

Identification and Deportation ------------------------------

6.(C/NF) Secretary Chertoff mentioned the public debate in the United States concerning secure identification and observed that similar issues were emotive in Europe as well. Secretary Chertoff recommended the UK and U.S. use the SIPDIS November 30-December 1 meeting of EU G-6 Interior Ministers plus Secretary Chertoff to discuss the issue of deportations. Smith said there is a need to weigh national security and diplomatic assurances to protect individuals from torture. New UK legislation make convictions and long sentences the first priority in cases of terrorism and criminality. The second option is deportation, and the third choice is "control orders," she reported. At the same time, the UK seeks to fight abuse of asylum and fraudulent identities. Identity cards are the focus of the ability to protect and identify the public, Smith concluded. Farr expanded there are three issues of concern: (1) when to begin enrollment, (2) the uses of the ID cards (e.g., for access to hazardous materials), and (3) the bilateral sharing of information with the U.S. Farr recommended further discussion on these points.

7.(C/NF) Secretary Chertoff responded that, despite some controversy, the public wants a reliable system and the United States has increased the requirements for identification for travel within the western hemisphere. Smith agreed that the majority of the public seeks "secure identity management," particularly in her home district. Secretary Chertoff noted a vocal minority opposes ID cards.

SIPDIS Terrorism ---------

8.(S/NF) Secretary Chertoff also expressed the need to be vigilant against the potential for terrorist activities not just from al-Qaida but other groups, e.g., Hizbollah.

9.(U) DHS has cleared this cable. Visit London's Classified Website: XXXXXXXXXXXX. cfm Tuttle

Note this section ("Farr" is Home Office DG for Security and Counter-Terrorism Charles Farr):


So it looks as though the Home Office was telling the US that it would send them ID card information from the NIR.

This could be important regarding the census.

That looks like a false positive failure of fingerprint biometrics then.

If this biometric database technology actually worked as claimed, then given the millions of such visa applications, and the hundreds of thousands of terrorist / tourist suspects, shouldn't there be many more "hits" than this one false positive example, every single day ?

When was it ever made clear to the public that "ID Cards" could be required "for access to hazardous materials" ?

Which "hazardous materials" exactly ?

If you have a professional need to purchase, store and use , say, explosives or live bacteria or virus cultures, or radioactive material etc. the you already need a special licence. What extra security could an "ID card" provide, especially one which cannot be verified securely online over the internet or over the phone, like the now abandoned National Identity Scheme ?

Surely Charles Farr was not fantasising that the Home Office could magically "control" the bulk purchases of, say, hydrogen peroxide or acetone or ammonium nitrate fertiliser or even petrol etc. by forcing retailers or wholesalers to check "ID cards" at the checkout till ?

True.

Also true, another minority, not very vocal, advocated ID cards. And despite all the resources of government, they failed to bring ID cards about. That failure is astonishing. It should have been impossible.

How did they do it?

That's one for the business schools and the think tanks to have fun answering.

Whatever the answer, the suspicion is that Whitehall is irremediably incompetent.

are they 100% sure these are cases of identity fraud ?

could it be that their sampling of 2.8 million people has shown that fingerprints are not as unique as they have always been assumed to be, after all until recently no one has actually questioned this http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20527522.600-fingerprint-evidence-to-harden-up-at-last.html